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A Constellation of Benefits and a Universe of 
Equal Protection: The Extension of the Right 
to Marry Under Pavan v. Smith 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all 
persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry.1  In 2017, 
in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends 
that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself.2  Any 
person who would have been denied the right to marry the person 
of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of 
marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full 
“constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage 
among traditional opposite-sex couples.3  The Court believed that 
this interpretation was so plainly visible on Obergefell’s face that 
it rendered its decision in Pavan summarily, without oral 
argument.4 
Before Pavan, Arkansas’s birth certificate regime would 
have denied legally recognized motherhood to the woman 
married to a biological mother at the time of birth by denying a 
place for her name on the birth certificate.5  In its unsigned, per 
curiam opinion, the Supreme Court struck down the gender-
specific statutory language that made this outcome acceptable.6  
Dissenting Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justices Alito and 
Thomas, did not believe that such an outcome was so clear from 
    J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2019.  The author is indebted to 
Prof. Jordan Woods, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for 
his invaluable advice and encouragement in the drafting process.  The author would also like 
to thank Luke Brasuell for his assistance as Note and Comment Editor—as well as fellow 
editors, family, and friends—for their continual support. 
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
2. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (per curiam) (citing Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. at 2605).
3. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
4. Id. at 2076-77. 
5. Id. at 2077 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f)(1) (2014)).  See generally
infra Appendix (copy of statutory text). 
6. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
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the text of Obergefell and would have constrained the right to 
marry to the rights to licensing and recognition of marriage.7 
But what should be most troubling for advocates of same-
sex couples is not that Justice Gorsuch has a narrow, conservative 
vision of the right to marry.  Instead, advocates should more 
carefully note the exception to the broader right of marriage that 
he implies for purportedly “biology based“ family law regimes.8  
Under Nguyen v. INS, which Justice Gorsuch and the Arkansas 
Supreme Court majority cite with approval,9 gender 
discrimination may surmount heightened scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause if it is based on the biological differences 
between the sexes rather than impermissible stereotypes.10  Yet 
Nguyen was met with a forceful dissent and abundant criticism 
from commentators for its weak application of heightened 
scrutiny and its use of impermissible gender stereotypes glossed 
as rational assumptions.11  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, decided 
two weeks before Pavan, more strongly applies heightened 
scrutiny to gender discrimination and takes a stronger stance 
against “overbroad generalizations” of gender than Nguyen.12 
This Note on Pavan v. Smith will argue not only that Justice 
Gorsuch erroneously interprets Obergefell, other caselaw, and the 
relevant statutes, but also that his preference for Nguyen over 
Morales-Santana signals the dangerous potential for a future 
Court and many lower courts to disrupt the lives of same-sex 
parents.  To meet that threat, advocates should use Obergefell, 
Pavan, and Morales-Santana in analytical concert.  This Note 
provides a starting point for such analysis. 
Part I of this Note tracks the procedural history of this case 
from the trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court.13  Part II sets up 
the argument by synthesizing two relevant lines of U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent on: (1) the importance of the benefits of marriage 
7. Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8. Id. 
9. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001)); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437,
at 17-18, 505 S.W.3d 169, 181 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73), rev’d per curiam 137 S. Ct. 
2075 (2017). 
10. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68, 73 (2001).
11. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see sources cited infra note 323.
12. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
13. See infra Part I. 
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to a definition of marriage;14 and, (2) the use of biological 
distinctions in equal-protection sex discrimination 
jurisprudence.15 
Part III makes two arguments agreeing with the majority’s 
analysis and countering the dissent of Justice Gorsuch.16  First, 
the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court majority is “clearly 
in error” because the Court’s interpretation of Obergefell is 
correct and the Arkansas birth certificate statutes do not create a 
purely biology-based birth records regime.17  The Court’s opinion 
is supported by three types of precedent: (1) cases incorporating 
the legal benefits of marriage within the right to marry; (2) earlier 
cases implying the right of a married couple to a birth certificate; 
and, (3) Obergefell, which plainly requires states to grant same-
sex marriage on the same “terms and conditions” as opposite-sex 
marriage.18  Second, the application of Nguyen v. INS to defend 
statutes conferring marriage benefits unequally between 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples is limited by both the 
heightened scrutiny standard articulated in Morales-Santana and 
the expanded definition of the fundamental right to marry 
clarified in Pavan.19  Although other commentators have already 
explored the flaws of Nguyen and shown how Morales-Santana 
limits it,20 this Part demonstrates how the broad reach of Pavan 
can be and has been used together with Obergefell and Morales-
Santana to protect the rights of married same-sex couples, 
individual parents in same-sex divorces, and possibly even 
transgender persons who are not in same-sex marriages.21 
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. See infra Section III.B.
20. See sources cited infra note 323.
21. See infra Section III.B.
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I. CASE SUMMARY
A. FACTS AND CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING
Three married female couples, the Pavans, the Jacobses, and 
Courtney Kassell and Kelly Scott (“the couples”), filed suit to 
seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas 
Department of Health (“ADH”).22  The suit stemmed from the 
refusal of ADH to issue birth certificates for their respective 
children that included the names of both spouses, which they 
argued “violated their constitutional rights to equal protection and 
due process.”23  The Jacobses and Pavans married in 2010 and 
2011.24  Terrah Pavan and Leigh Jacobs gave birth to their 
children in Arkansas in May and June 2015.25  Both conceived 
through assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) involving an 
anonymous donor.26  In both cases, ADH would not place the 
names of Marisa Pavan and Jana Jacobs on the birth certificate.27  
Courtney Kassell and Kelly Scott resided in Arkansas when 
Courtney gave birth in January 2015.28  As with the Pavans and 
Jacobses, Courtney and Kelly conceived through ART involving 
an anonymous donor.29  The couple married in July 2015.30  The 
couple made multiple requests that ADH place Kelly’s name on 
22. Complaint at 10-12, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 
2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153). 
23. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d 169, 173, rev’d per curiam 137
S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
24. Id. at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
25. Id. at 2, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
26. Id. at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172.  Note that all courts involved use the term “artificial
insemination” to describe the means by which the child is conceived.  Apart from mentions 
of the “artificial insemination” statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2015), where the term 
is explicitly used, this author believes it is more appropriate to give the label of “assisted 
reproductive technology” to any means of conception other than insemination by intercourse.  
This term is meant to encompass not only intrauterine or intracervical insemination of donor 
sperm but also in vitro fertilization, which is performed outside the body.  However, federal 
law, and therefore the CDC, defines ART more narrowly to include only treatments 
involving “the handling of human oocytes or embryos,” not sperm alone.  42 U.S.C. § 263a-
7(1) (2012); see also CDC, What is Assisted Reproductive Technology? (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html [https://perma.cc/2ZCW-7PLL].  
27. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
28. Id. at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 172-73. 
29. Id. at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173.
30. Id. 
2019 A CONSTELLATION OF BENEFITS 249 
the birth certificate, both before and after the marriage, and ADH 
denied them the alteration each time.31 
The couples sought three avenues of relief: (1) to have 
certain statutory provisions governing the issuance of birth 
certificates, including Arkansas Code Annotated sections 20-18-
401(e), (f) and 20-18-406(a)(2), “declared unconstitutional as 
written;”32 (2) to enjoin the Director of ADH, Nathaniel Smith, 
from “refusing to list the names of both spouses of a same-sex 
couple on the birth certificate of [a] minor child;”33 and (3) to 
require Smith, by court order, “to issue corrected birth certificates 
naming both spouses.”34 
There were two statutory provisions against which the 
couples sought declaratory relief: Arkansas Code Annotated 
sections 20-18-401(e), (f) and -406(a)(2).35  The portions of 
section 20-18-401 governed entry of the names of the parents on 
a child’s birth certificate,36 while section 20-18-406(a)(2) 
addressed the issuance of a new birth certificate to a “person” who 
has been “legitimated.”37  Petitioners’ constitutional complaints 
arose from section 20-18-401’s gender-specific references to the 
“father” of the child and the “husband” of the mother and the 
State’s exclusionary interpretation of the term “legitimated” as 
used in section 20-18-406(a)(2).38 
31. Id. 
32. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173.  This Note cites to the 2014
replacement volume of the Arkansas Code Annotated when referring to sections 20-18-401 
and 20-18-406.  When referring to section 9-10-201, this Note cites to the 2015 replacement 
volume.  This is because both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court refer 
to these replacement volumes.  See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per 
curiam); Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2, 4, 505 S.W.3d at 172-73.  Since the Supreme Court 
handed down Pavan, the Arkansas legislature has not amended any of these statutes in 
compliance with Pavan, and the text remains substantially the same as of 2018.  See ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201, 20-18-401(e), (f); 20-18-406(a)(2) (2018). 
33. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173. 
34. Id. 
35. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Brief at 14-16, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 
12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153) [hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment”]; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f) (2014), invalidated by 
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2) 
(2014).  See generally infra Appendix (copy of statutory text). 
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f).
37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2).
38. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 12, 15-16. 
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In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the State claimed that 
Petitioners’ constitutional challenges should have failed because 
“parental rights, and parental designations on birth certificates, do 
not arise from marital relationships.”39 Though the common-law 
doctrine of in loco parentis and the statutory construct of adoption 
both exist as modes of finding a relationship between a parent and 
a child not biologically related, each doctrine “does not turn on 
any marital relationship between the intended parent and a 
biological parent of a child.”40  There would be no due process 
violation, so the State claimed, because non-biological parents 
and children do not have the constitutional right to a parental 
relationship with each other.41  The State also claimed that there 
was no equal protection violation because the statutes classified 
based on the biological parentage of the couples, not their gender 
or sexual orientation.42 
In the couples’ own motion for summary judgment and 
response, they made four arguments that were ultimately relevant: 
(1) that in 2014, the State had already been enjoined by Judge
Chris Piazza of the Pulaski County Circuit Court in Wright v.
State from enforcing any law which denied same-sex married
couples “the rights, recognition and benefits associated with
marriage in the State of Arkansas;”43 (2) that the State was not in
compliance with Obergefell v. Hodges because the decision
mandated the extension of both civil marriage and its benefits to
same-sex couples, specifically including “birth and death
certificates;”44 (3) that Petitioners could not wait for “the
democratic process” to amend the offending statutes in lieu of a
court order;45 and (4) that Petitioners’ rights under the Due
39. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶9, at 4, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 
12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. ¶9, at 5.
42. Id. ¶10, at 5.  On a minor note, the State made no citation to Obergefell v. Hodges
in its Motion for Summary Judgment Motion and brief, despite an admission in its Answer 
to the Complaint that Obergefell “speaks for itself.”  Answer ¶4, at 2, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 
WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153). 
43. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 6-8 (quoting Wright
v. State, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998002, at *2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2014), appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298 (per curiam)).
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. Id. at 10-11.
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Process and Equal Protection Clauses were violated.46  The due 
process claim linked the naming of both spouses on the birth 
certificate to both the fundamental right to marry and the right for 
a parent to raise a child as she sees fit.47  For their equal protection 
claim, Petitioners argued as members of two classes—sexual 
orientation and gender—that heightened scrutiny should apply 
and that the statutes survive neither intermediate scrutiny nor 
even the “basic standards” of rational-basis review.48 
In its reply,49 the State first interpreted the Wright injunction 
narrowly in light of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e), 
which mandated that injunction orders “shall describe in 
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other 
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained or mandated.”50  
Because the Wright court never mentioned birth certificates or 
gave any related instruction to ADH, Rule 65(e) foreclosed the 
argument “that ADH ha[d] already been enjoined to amend birth 
certificates.”51  Next, the State similarly limited Obergefell to its 
basic holding protecting same-sex marriage in itself and pointed 
to the absence of specific language in Obergefell “requiring states 
to amend birth certificates as requested in this case.”52  Finally, 
the State rebutted Petitioners’ direct equal protection and due 
process arguments and so asked the court to subject its actions to 
rational basis review and hold its actions justified by “numerous 
rational, and even compelling, governmental interests.”53 
46. Id. at 16-26.
47. Id. at 25-26.
48. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 17-25. 
49. Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 
2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153) [hereinafter “Defendant’s Reply”]. 
50.  Id. at 4 (quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 65(e) (2017) (omitted 2018)) (emphases omitted).
Although the Defendant’s Reply and the Circuit Court both cite to Rule 65(e), the Arkansas 
Supreme Court opinions instead cite to Rule 65(d)(1)(C), which contains the same 
instruction in substance: “Every order granting an injunction . . . must . . . describe in 
reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts 
restrained or required.”  ARK. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C).  In 2018, Rule 65(e) was omitted from 
the Rules of Civil Procedure for stylistic purposes.  ARK. R. CIV. P.  65 reporter’s note 6. 
51. Defendant’s Reply, supra note 49, at 4.
52. Id. at 4-5.
53. Id. at 5-9.  The interests cited by the State included: “ensuring the accuracy of vital
records; allowing the ADH to compile, maintain, and analyze accurate vital statistics for 
purposes of public health research and identification of public health trends; and allowing 
individual identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions.”  Id. at 8-9. 
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The Circuit Court of Pulaski County, under Judge Davis 
Fox, issued a memorandum opinion denying the State’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment with respect to the couples in their 
individual capacities and granting in part and denying in part the 
couples’ Motion for Summary Judgment in their individual 
capacities.54  First, the court found that the Wright injunction was 
binding on the State as res judicata because it had missed two 
opportunities in its appeal of Wright to raise the issue of the 
injunction’s compliance with Rule 65(e) and could not 
collaterally attack the judgment in the instant proceeding.55  Next, 
the court issued its own judgment declaring the majority of 
section 20-18-401(e), (f) unconstitutional and ordering an 
interpretation of section 20-18-406(a)(2) that would be inclusive 
of same-sex couples.56  In its explanation of the legal effect of the 
judgment, the court passed on a guarantee of broad constitutional 
rights for same-sex persons and instead defined the “sum total” of 
the decision’s legal effect as a guarantee to the Petitioners of “the 
same constitutional rights with respect to the issuance of birth 
certificates and amended birth certificates as opposite-sex 
couples.”57  The court specifically found that section 20-18-
401(e), (f) “intertwined the concepts of ‘parent’ with certain 
rights and presumptions occurring within a marital relationship, 
using now impermissible limiting spousal terms of ‘husband’ and 
‘wife.’”58  To Judge Fox, this language “categorically prohibits” 
same-sex married couples from enjoying spousal benefits equal 
to those available to opposite-sex couples.59  Although the State 
foreclosed an as-applied challenge by issuing birth certificates 
54. Pavan v. Smith, No. 60CV-15-3153, 2015 WL 12990015, at *1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 
1, 2015).  The court granted and denied the State’s and couples’ motions for summary 
judgment, respectively, “with respect to the claims of the plaintiffs as parents, next friends, 
and guardians of their respective minor children.”  Id. at *2.  The court dismissed with 
prejudice all causes of action pursued in such “representative capacities.”  Id. 
55. Id. at *4-5.
56. Id. at *5-8.
57. Id. at *11. 
58. Id. at *6.
59. Pavan, 2015 WL 12990015, at *6.
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naming both spouses of each couple,60 it appealed on the other 
merits.61 
B. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the 
Circuit Court’s judgment.62  The justices were divided 6-1 on 
some issues and 5-2 on others, but Justice Hart could only gain a 
majority of four votes for her opinion.63  On the constitutional 
merits issues, Justice Hart’s majority limited Obergefell to its 
basic holding recognizing the right to marriage recognition, and 
then ruled against the couples on their due process and equal 
protection claims.64  The other three justices were divided 
between the two very different partial concurrences of Chief 
Justice Brill and Justice Wood, as well as the full dissent of Justice 
Danielson.65 
1. Hart’s Majority
First, as to the issue of the Wright orders, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that the State was not required to follow the 
Wright injunction due to Wright’s lack of specific instructions 
concerning birth certificates.66  The majority reasoned that it does 
not matter that the State could have raised the issues at certain 
points in the Wright appeal because the language of the Wright 
orders “would not have placed Smith on notice” of a need to raise 
arguments “related to “the overbreadth of the injunctive relief 
granted and to the issuance of birth certificates.”67  As for the 
Circuit Court’s reliance on Obergefell to strike or reinterpret the 
statutes at issue, the state high court majority rejected its analysis, 
60. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 14, 505 S.W.3d 169, 179.
61.  See Amended Notice of Appeal ¶2, at 2, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153). 
62. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
63. Id. at 1, 505 S.W.3d at 169.
64. Id. at 9-13, 19, 505 S.W.3d at 176-78, 181-82.
65. Id. at 21-28, 505 S.W.3d at 183-86 (Brill, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 28-33, 505 S.W.3d at 186-89 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 33-37, 505 S.W.3d at 189-91 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 7, 505 S.W.3d at 175 (majority opinion).
67. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 7, 505 S.W.3d at 175.
254 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:1 
favoring the State’s narrow interpretation of Obergefell which 
limited the decision to its fundamental holding.68 
The court then concluded that despite language in Obergefell 
warning against a “slower case-by-case determination of the 
required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex 
couples,”69 the statutes at issue “pass constitutional muster.”70  
Using plain-meaning construction and a presumption of 
constitutionality, the court concluded that each of the statutes at 
issue center “on the relationship of the biological mother and the 
biological father to the child, not on the marital relationship,” 
even though section 20-18-401(e), (f) uses terms such as 
“husband” and “wife.”71 
Not only did the majority find no language in Obergefell 
which answered the questions presented in the case, but it could 
find no other support for a facial challenge to the statutory 
language on due process and equal protection grounds.72  The 
court stated that only one distinct issue was subject to its due 
process analysis: “whether the birth-certificate statutes as written 
deny the [couples] due process.”73  The scope of the question is 
narrow because the purpose of the statutes, “to truthfully record 
the nexus of the biological mother and the biological father to the 
child,” concerned neither the right to same-sex marriage nor the 
right to be a parent to the child of one’s same-sex spouse.74  As 
such, the fundamental rights to marry and make decisions as a 
parent were irrelevant, and the naming of the nonbiological 
spouse on a birth certificate was not a fundamental “interest of the 
person.”75 
In response to the equal protection claim, the court first 
answered the contention of disparate treatment resulting from the 
statutes’ permission of male spouses to be listed as fathers, “even 
though the male spouse may not be the child’s biological 
68. Id. at 9-10, 505 S.W.3d at 176-77. 
69. Id. at 10, 505 S.W.3d at 177 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 
(2015)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 10-12, 505 S.W.3d at 177-78. 
72. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 12-19, 505 S.W.3d at 178-82. 
73. Id. at 16, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
74. Id. at 16-17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
75. Id. at 17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
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father.”76  The court countered with the observation that a 
husband’s designation as the father may be refuted under section 
20-18-401(f), “which evidences that the biological connection is
what the birth certificate intends to record,” rather than a
statement on the marriage of the parents.77  Citing United States
Supreme Court precedent, the court stated, “[i]t does not violate
equal protection to acknowledge basic biological truths.”78  The
court acquiesced to the couples’ request for heightened scrutiny,79
but then applied it in the State’s favor:  the statutes serve the
“important governmental objective [of] tracing public-health
trends and providing critical assistance to an individual’s
identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions,”
and the requirement on a birth certificate of biological relation of
a mother and father to the child was “substantially related to the
achievement” of that objective.80
In its final comment on the merits of the case, the court 
addressed an alternative form of relief for the couples raised by 
the State in its brief and during oral argument: that the court 
amend Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-201(a).81  The 
State conceded that this statute, permitting a child conceived by 
“artificial insemination” to be “deemed the legitimate natural 
child” of its married mother and the mother’s “husband,” was 
unconstitutional.82  But because the court “is not a legislative 
body” and because the Circuit Court never ruled on that statute’s 
constitutionality, the court declined to address the issue.83 
76. Id. 
77. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437 at 17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
78. Id. at 17-18, 505 S.W.3d at 181; see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (“The
difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the 
principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a 
manner specific to each gender.”). 
79. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 18, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 18-19, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
82. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015)).  See generally infra
Appendix (copy of statutory text). 
83. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 18-19, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
256 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:1 
2. Brill’s Concurrence/Dissent
In his partial concurrence and dissent, Chief Justice Brill 
argued that the issuance of birth certificates to same-sex married 
couples “on the same basis” as opposite-sex married couples was 
“[t]he logical extension of Obergefell, mandated by the Due 
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.”84  The Chief 
Justice presented his argument by framing the issue “in light of 
three scenarios:” artificial insemination with married couples, 
artificial insemination with unmarried couples, and adoption.85  
Each scenario presents two couples, one same-sex with two 
women and one opposite-sex, who wish to become parents.86  
This Note will only address the first two scenarios in detail, as the 
Chief Justice’s solution for the third is trivial: “Under the 
rationale of Obergefell, both married couples are to be treated 
equally.  The law is now gender-neutral. . . .”87 
In the first scenario, the couples are married.88  Each uses 
ART with an anonymous donor’s sperm, and each woman bearing 
a child gives birth.89  To the Chief Justice, the applicable statute 
was section 9-10-201(a), the provision which directly addressed 
artificial insemination and which the majority refused to 
address.90  Under that statute, the sperm donor “has no legal 
responsibility or rights to the child” of the opposite-sex couple, 
and the birth certificate would name each member of that couple 
as a parent, provided that the “husband” has consented in writing 
to the artificial insemination.91  But as for the same-sex couple, 
the statutory language states “husband” instead of “spouse,” 
excluding that couple from the ability to consent to the 
84. Id. at 23, 505 S.W.3d at 183-84 (Brill, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). 
85. Id. at 23-26, 505 S.W.3d at 184-85.  The scenario involving unmarried couples
was ultimately not pertinent to the United States Supreme Court’s decision, since Courtney 
Kassell and Kelley Scott, the subjects of the Chief Justice’s second scenario, did not petition 
for certiorari alongside their co-plaintiffs.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at II, Pavan v. 
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (No. 16-992). 
86. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 23-24, 26, 505 S.W.3d at 184-85. 
87. Id. at 26, 505 S.W.3d at 185.
88. Id. at 23, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 24, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015).
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insemination for purposes of naming each spouse on the birth 
certificate.92  Given that this first scenario applies to two of the 
three couples and that the Circuit Court decreed the issuance of 
their birth certificates pursuant to Obergefell without rewriting 
the artificial insemination statute,93 the Chief Justice “would 
[have] remand[ed] this part of the circuit court’s order for 
appropriate action.”94 
In the second scenario, neither couple is married, but each 
also uses artificial insemination to conceive and bear children.95  
Because neither couple is married at the time of artificial 
insemination, neither may use section 9-10-201(a).96  To address 
these couples, the Chief Justice first asks the question, “[a]fter 
Obergefell, may the burden on the same-sex couple be greater 
than the burden on the opposite-sex couple?”97  To Chief Justice 
Brill, that burden is palpable within the applicable statute, section 
20-18-406(a)(2), because its process for determining that a
“person has been legitimated” is “not obvious in the case of a
same-sex couple.”98  Nonetheless, the Circuit Court “exceeded its
authority in giving a court-ordered definition of the phrase
‘person has been legitimated,’” and furthermore “had no basis” to
strike section 20-18-401(e), (f).99  Even though the Chief Justice
stressed that “[l]egislative and executive actions are necessary to
provide what Obergefell requires,” he concurred with the
majority in its refusal to alter or reinterpret the statutes at issue.100
3. Justice Wood’s Concurrence/Dissent
Justice Wood also joined the court in its reversal of the 
constitutional challenges to sections 20-19-401 and -406, but 




95. Id.  The Chief Justice here draws the term “artificial insemination” directly from
the statute.  See supra note 26. 
96. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 24, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 25, 505 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2) (2014)).
99. Id. at 25, 505 S.W.3d at 185 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2)).
100. Id. at 25-26, 505 S.W.3d at 185.
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would have remanded the order instead of dismissing it.101  For 
Justice Wood, a remand would make sense under the federal court 
doctrine of “prudential-mootness,” which she encouraged the 
court to adopt.102  Because the case was “fluctuating and 
underdeveloped,” the court should have withheld relief in light of 
“considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches 
of government [that] counsel the court to stay its hand, and to 
withhold relief it has the power to grant.”103  Two developments 
since the start of litigation, the State’s issuance of relief in the 
form of “the appropriate birth certificates” and its concession that 
the artificial insemination statute should comply with Obergefell, 
“render the majority’s decision provisional.”104  Because there 
was such a change in both the material facts and the posture of 
the State, Justice Wood argued that the court should have 
remanded for the Circuit Court to consider these facts,105 though 
she agreed with Chief Justice Brill that the legislature could 
address the issue as well, especially with the opportunity 
presented by a remand.106  Justice Wood also departed with the 
majority’s interpretation of Obergefell, believing that under its 
equal protection analysis, “states cannot constitutionally deny 
same-sex couples the benefits of marital status, which include 
equal access to birth certificates.”107 
4. Justice Danielson’s Dissent
Justice Danielson was the only justice to fully dissent from 
the majority opinion.108  He argued that both the Wright orders 
and Obergefell compelled the result reached in the Circuit Court’s 
order.109  First, Justice Danielson concluded that the Wright 
injunction encompassed “all” the injunctive relief requested by 
101. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 28, 505 S.W.3d at 186 (Wood, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (quoting S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.
1997)). 
104. Id. at 29, 505 S.W.3d at 187.
105. Id. at 30-31, 505 S.W.3d at 187-88. 
106. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 32, 505 S.W.3d at 188.
107. Id. at 32, 505 S.W.3d at 188-89. 
108. Id. at 33, 505 S.W.3d at 189 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
109. Id. 
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the Wright plaintiffs, including the issuance of appropriate birth 
certificates for children born of same-sex parents.110  Even though 
the injunction failed to meet the specificity required by Rule 
65(d)(1) and (e), Justice Danielson agreed with the Circuit Court 
that this argument against Wright in the instant proceeding is an 
impermissible collateral attack on the judgment.111 
Second, Justice Danielson concluded that the language, 
principles, and history of Obergefell show that it extended the 
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.112  As applied to this 
case, he reasoned that Obergefell requires “the inclusion of a 
parent’s name on a child’s birth certificate” to “be accorded to 
same-sex spouses and opposite-sex spouses with equal force.”113  
He also concluded that the majority’s holding that section 20-18-
401(f) “focus[es] on biological relationships rather than marital 
ones” was in error.114  For parents married “at the time of either 
conception or birth or between conception and birth,” section 20-
18-401(f) presumptively names the “husband” of the mother on
the birth certificate as father of the child.115  This parental
presumption, made “without regard to any biological relationship
and on the sole basis of [the father’s] marriage to the mother,”
was enacted for an “obvious” policy: “to legitimate children
whenever possible.”116
C. U.S. SUPREME COURT SUMMARY REVERSAL
1. Per Curiam Opinion
In the first sentence of its per curiam opinion in Pavan v. 
Smith,117 the United States Supreme Court provides a simple 
explanation for its summary reversal of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court: “As this Court explained in Obergefell v. Hodges, . . . the 
110. Id. (quoting Wright v. State, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998002, at *1 (Ark.
Cir. Ct. May 15, 2014), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298 
(per curiam)). 
111. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 34, 505 S.W.3d at 189.
112. Id. at 34-35, 505 S.W.3d at 189-90. 
113. Id. at 34-36, 505 S.W.3d at 189-90. 
114. Id. at 35, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
115. Id. at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
116. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
117. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
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Constitution entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage ‘on the 
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.’”118  The 
Court stressed that Obergefell contained a “commitment to 
provide same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the 
States have linked to marriage.’”119  It further reasoned that the 
state court’s decision allows “differential treatment” in that the 
State of Arkansas “need not . . . issue birth certificates including 
the female spouses of women who give birth in the State.”120  In 
the Court’s view, the result of the state court’s opinion would be 
that “same-sex parents in Arkansas lack the same right as 
opposite-sex parents to be listed on the child’s birth certificate, a 
document often used for important transactions like making 
medical decisions for a child or enrolling a child in school.”121 
In Obergefell, the Court “held the relevant state laws 
unconstitutional to the extent they treated same-sex couples 
differently from opposite-sex couples.”122  The Court in Pavan 
concluded that this holding “applies with equal force to [Arkansas 
Code Annotated section] 20-18-401.”123  The Court answered the 
argument of the State that “a birth certificate is simply a device 
for recording biological parentage” rather than “a benefit that 
attends marriage” by pointing to the statute’s requirement that the 
“husband” of the birth mother of a child conceived by anonymous 
sperm donation be placed on the birth certificate.”124  Because the 
husband “is definitively not the biological father” under such 
circumstances, Arkansas “has thus chosen to make its birth 
certificates more than a mere marker of biological 
relationships.”125  The State instead uses the certificates “to give 
married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to 
unmarried parents.”126 
118. Id. at 2076 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)).
119. Id. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 2078.
122. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citing Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 3-4, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075 
(No. 16-992), 2017 WL 1397395; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075 
(No. 16-992), 2017 WL 587527). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 2078-79. 
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2. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissent
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, 
dissented in the belief that the case does not warrant “the strong 
medicine of summary reversal.”127  Because summary reversal 
requires that “the decision below [be] clearly in error,”128 he 
addressed the challenge to section 20-18-401 by limiting the 
scope of Obergefell’s “”holding to “the question whether a State 
must recognize same-sex marriages.”129  To Justice Gorsuch, 
“nothing in Obergefell spoke (let alone clearly) to the question 
whether [section] 20-18-401 . . . must go.”130  He was convinced 
that the rationales for biology-based birth registration regimes 
proffered by the State “in no way offend Obergefell.”131  In his 
view, the Arkansas Supreme Court opinion was not an act of 
defiance, but rather an attempt to “earnestly engage 
Obergefell.”132  And “to the extent they speak to the question at 
all,” precedents suggest that birth registration “based on biology” 
does not offend the Constitution,133 and the Court’s opinion does 
not “purport to identify any constitutional problem” with such a 
regime.134 
Justice Gorsuch then supposed that the Court issued 
summary reversal because it was concerned instead with the 
marriage-based artificial insemination exception to Arkansas’s 
biology-based birth certificate regime.135  Justice Gorsuch had 
three problems with the use of section 9-10-201(a) for a summary 
reversal.136  First, the couples “didn’t actually challenge [section] 
9-10-201 in their lawsuit.”137  Second, the State conceded that the
benefits of section 9-10-201 “must be afforded equally” to all
127. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079-80 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).





132. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079.
133. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 2079-80. 
137. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079.
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couples, meaning that with the issuance of birth certificates to 
Petitioners and those similarly situated, it is not clear what will 
“happen on remand that hasn’t happened already.”138  Third, in 
the case of adoption, another exception to the biology-based birth 
certificate regime, adopting parents are always eligible for 
placement on birth certificates “without respect to sexual 
orientation.”139  Because section 9-10-201 was not “fairly 
challenged,” amending that statute by state supreme court order 
would be “hardly the usual reward for seeking faithfully to apply, 
not evade, this Court’s mandates.”140  It is therefore a problem for 
Gorsuch that this is the only “remedial suggestion” that he can 
offer and that the Court offers none at all.141 
II. TWO RELEVANT LINES OF PRECEDENT
This section summarizes two lines of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent relevant to the courts’ reasoning in Pavan as the case 
progressed from the Arkansas Circuit Court to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Part A concerns the line of cases leading up to and 
including Obergefell that addressed the importance of the 
material benefits of marriage with respect to a fundamental right 
to marry.142  Part B involves the way in which laws based on 
biological differences should be subject to heightened scrutiny for 
compliance with equal protection.143  As scholars have amply 
argued, these purportedly “biological“ differences are usually 
based in impermissible generalizations of gender, including social 
roles and statistical generalities, as well as outright unfounded 
stereotypes.144 




142. See infra Section II.A.
143. See infra Section II.B.
144. See sources cited infra note 323.
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A. THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
1. Loving, Zablocki, and Turner
In the six decades before the U.S. Supreme Court seriously 
considered marriage as a right applicable to same-sex couples, the 
Court defended the right to marry regardless of the race,145 child 
support status,146 or even imprisonment of a partner.147  On this 
last issue, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court in Turner v. 
Safley, concluded that prison inmates without life sentences were 
entitled to the right to marry.148  In reaching the result, the Court 
drew on a definition of a constitutionally significant marital 
relationship that incorporates various attendant benefits of 
marriage.149 
Turner was the culmination of a trilogy of cases establishing 
and defining the fundamental right to marry.150  The first of these 
was Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court famously invalidated 
laws banning interracial marriage.151  That unanimous decision 
rested on both equal protection and due process grounds, and it 
was the due process ruling which provided constitutional law with 
its first post-World War II defense of the marriage right.152  Yet 
Loving is rooted in the rather traditional rationale of ensuring 
procreation, a policy expressed in the older cases it cites: 
“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental 
to our very existence and survival.”153 
145. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
146. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
147. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
148. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96; c.f. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974) (affirming
trial court’s denial of marriage to inmates sentenced to life imprisonment). 
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
150. See id.; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-86; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
151. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
152. Id.; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. 
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . .”). 
153. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); see also Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (“[Marriage] is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its 
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The second case of the trilogy, Zablocki v. Redhail, reaffirms 
this policy while linking it to the even broader fundamental right 
to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.154  Invalidating 
a Wisconsin statute which prevented noncustodial parent-
obligors of child support from marrying without a court order, the 
Court recognized marriage’s placement on the same level as other 
decisions of family life, including procreation, childbirth, child 
rearing, and family relationships.155  To the Court, it would have 
made “little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to 
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to 
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our 
society.”156  The Court in Zablocki thus linked marriage not only 
to procreation but also to the social construct of the family 
overall.157 
In Turner, the right of most prisoners to marry, even without 
the involvement of procreation or children, was protected because 
the Court recognized an even broader scope to the spousal 
relationship than it did in Zablocki.  To the Court, a 
“constitutionally protected marital relationship” exists because 
enough “important attributes of marriage” remain “unaffected by 
the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections 
goals.”158  Such elements not only include “religious and personal 
aspects” but also legal “incidents of marriage” including 
“government benefits (e.g. Social Security benefits), property 
rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, 
less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of 
wedlock).”159  Justice O’Connor thus culminated the trilogy of the 
first modern marriage right cases with a constitutionally 
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, 
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”). 
154. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 
(1965) (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . .  Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.”). 
155. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87, 390-91 (citing Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)). 
156. Id. at 386.
157. Id. 
158. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987). 
159. Id. 
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significant definition of marriage made partly in terms of the 
benefits conferred on the union by the government.160 
2. United States v. Windsor
In United States v. Windsor, the Court invalidated section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which limited the 
federal definition of “marriage” to opposite-sex couples.161  The 
statute thus denied the application of over 1,000 federal statutes 
and regulations to lawfully married same-sex couples.162  The 
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, filed suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of DOMA because it barred her from claiming a 
federal benefit of marriage to her late spouse, the estate tax 
exemption for surviving spouses.163  Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the Court, stated his argument in two components.  First, DOMA 
departed from the “history and tradition of reliance on state law 
to define marriage” to the end of injuring a class protected by a 
state.164  Second, this disruption of “the federal balance” violated 
both Due Process and Equal Protection principles under the Fifth 
Amendment by evidencing “a bare congressional desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group.”165 
DOMA’s effect on federal benefits was a central 
consideration for Justice Kennedy in both of these component 
arguments.166  By its interference with the States’ interest in “the 
definition and regulation of marriage,” DOMA rejected “the long-
established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of 
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, 
though they may vary . . . from one State to the next.”167  That 
DOMA deviated from such tradition and operated to “deprive 
same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come 
with federal recognition of their marriages” was cited as strong 
evidence of DOMA’s impermissible “purpose and effect of 
160. Id. at 95-96. 
161. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749-52 (2013). 
162. Id. at 752.
163. Id. at 753.
164. Id. at 767-68. 
165.  Id. at 770 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)).
166. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752, 768-70. 
167. Id. at 768.
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disapproval” of same-sex married couples.168  By the operation of 
denial of benefits, DOMA forced same-sex couples to live 
“unmarried for the purpose of federal law” even with a state 
license, and thus “DOMA undermine[d] both the public and 
private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.”169 
3. Obergefell v. Hodges
The Court made its attention to the state-provided benefits 
of marriage more explicit as it held, in Obergefell v. Hodges,170 
that same-sex couples were entitled to civil marriage “on the same 
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”171  Eight of the 
case’s fourteen plaintiff couples, and both plaintiff widowers, 
challenged a state’s refusal to recognize an out-of-state marriage 
license because the state denied the benefits which would 
accompany such a license.172  The widowers, James Obergefell 
and David Michener, filed an injunction to require Ohio to list 
their names as spouses on their husbands’ death certificates.173  
Four other Ohio couples sought recognition of their marriages on 
their children’s birth certificates, and argued that Ohio’s refusal 
to recognize their marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
“no matter what marital benefit [was] affected.”174  Four 
Kentucky couples sought to enjoin that state’s recognition ban 
while citing its associated hardships, including “loss of tax 
breaks” and “exclusion from intestacy laws.”175  Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court characterized the petitioners’ 
motive for seeking recognized marriage as “their respect—and 
need—for its privileges and responsibilities.”176 
In its recognition of marriage as a fundamental right 
protected under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited four “principles and 
168. Id. at 770.
169. Id. at 772.
170. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
171. Id. at 2593, 2605.
172. Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397-99 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Deboer, 772 F.3d at 398.
174. Deboer, 772 F.3d at 398.
175. Id. 
176. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (emphasis added).
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traditions” of its jurisprudence in its characterization of the 
right.177  The fourth and final listed principle involved the nature 
of marriage as “a keystone of our social order.”178  The Court 
explained that because marriage is such an essential institution of 
American society, “society pledge[s] to support the couple, 
offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and 
nourish the union.”179 Although the Court noted that “States are 
in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married 
couples,” it drew a list of specific “governmental rights, benefits, 
and responsibilities” of which states have “made marriage the 
basis.”180  Thus the denial of “the constellation of benefits that the 
States have linked to marriage” to same-sex couples is itself a 
“harm [that] results in more than just material burdens.”181 
The dissenting opinions did not deny that the availability of 
government benefits was an aspect of marriage.182  Chief Justice 
Roberts noted his belief that his equal protection analysis, which 
was not favorable to same-sex marriage in general, “might be 
different . . . if [the Court was] confronted with a more focused 
challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits.”183  Likely as 
a counter to this suggestion, the Court cautioned, “Were the Court 
to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the 
required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex 
couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and 
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.”184  Justice Alito, 
177. Id. at 2599-2602. 
178. Id. at 2601.
179. Id. at 2601 (emphasis added).
180. Id.  The Court listed several examples of such “aspects of marital status:”
[T]axation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession;
spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical
decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors;
birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child
custody, support, and visitation rules.
Id. (emphasis added). 
181. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
182. Id. at 2623, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting); id.
at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631, 2634-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Although the following remark may be
interpreted as sarcasm, the Chief Justice also invited those who support same-sex marriage 
to “[c]elebrate the availability of new benefits.”  Id. at 2626. 
184. Id. at 2606 (majority opinion).
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meanwhile, in his defense of a “traditional” definition of marriage 
linked to procreation, framed the definitional arguments of the 
“different schools of philosophy” as explanations for “why 
society should formalize marriage and attach special benefits and 
obligations to persons who marry.”185 
Justices Scalia and Justice Thomas characterized the benefits 
described by the court as “entitlements.”186  But while Justice 
Scalia briefly dismissed such benefits as part of his rebuttal to the 
Court’s conception of substantive due process,187 Justice Thomas 
framed a large portion of his argument as a philosophical rejection 
of liberty as “entitlement to government benefits.”188  And just as 
the Court did, so Justice Thomas characterized the petitioners’ 
claims in terms of specific benefits, including “the State’s 
imprimatur” in the form of “marriage licenses, death certificates, 
and other official forms.”189 
B. BIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND EQUAL
PROTECTION 
In his defense of purely biology-based birth registration, 
Justice Gorsuch relies on a constitutional history of cases which 
uphold gender discrimination in regulation of the family on the 
basis of purported biological factors.190  Yet the caselaw is neither 
unanimous nor confident in its acceptance of biological 
distinctions,191 and one of the opinions Justice Gorsuch cites, 
Nguyen v. INS,192 inspired a particularly strong dissent from 
Justice O’Connor and a large body of scholarly criticism.193  The 
185. Id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
186. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
187.  See id. at 2630 (“What say? What possible ‘essence’ does substantive due process
‘capture’ in an ‘accurate and comprehensive way’? It stands for nothing whatever, except 
those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really likes. . . . Hardly a distillation of 
essence.”). 
188. Id. at 2631, 2634-37. 
189. Id. at 2636.
190. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-125 
(1989) (plurality opinion)). 
191. See infra Section II.B.i-.ii.
192. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
193. See id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); sources cited infra note 313.
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currency of Nguyen as a defense of biology-based sex 
discrimination is also limited by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a 
decision filed only two weeks before Pavan.194  Examining this 
background, the analysis below first addresses the history of cases 
relying on biological distinctions prior to Nguyen,195 followed by 
the cases striking down gender discrimination laws that rely on 
stereotypes,196 and finally the opinions in Nguyen and Morales-
Santana.197 
1. The “Biological” Difference Between Mothers and
Fathers 
In its early application of the heightened scrutiny of Craig v. 
Boren,198 the Court tended to tolerate gender differentiation on 
the basis of “biological” differences, particularly where the laws 
affected parenthood or were otherwise related to reproductive 
biology.199  In fact, the Court at least once explicitly applied what 
Kim Shayo Buchanan terms the “sex discount” of equal 
protection review.200 While upholding a statute precluding fathers 
from suing for wrongful death of illegitimate children in Parham 
v. Hughes, the plurality held that minimal rational-basis review
applies to sex discrimination unless there is some indication of
“invidious discrimination.”201  In a companion case, Caban v.
Mohammed, dissenting Justices Stewart and Stevens linked their
votes in the plurality of Parham to the supposed “biological“
differences between mothers and fathers in parenthood.202
194. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
195. See infra Section II.B.i.
196. See infra Section II.B.ii.
197. See infra Section II.B.iii-.iv.
198. That well-traveled heightened scrutiny standard commands that gender
discrimination serve “important governmental objectives” and bear a substantial relationship 
to those interests.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
199. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1176-81
(2010). 
200. Id. at 1149. 
201. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion).  Justice Powell
arrived at the same result by purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, supplying the decisive 
vote.  Id. at 359-61 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
202. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397-99 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id.
at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Parham, 441 U.S. at 354-55 (plurality opinion). 
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In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court further reasoned from 
purportedly “biological“ principles to raise the bar of legal 
recognition for unwed fathers above that of unwed mothers.203  In 
Lehr, Justice Stevens quoted Justice Stewart’s Caban dissent on 
behalf of the Court: “The mother carries and bears the child, and 
in this sense her parental relationship is clear.  The validity of the 
father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures.”204  
That bar was justified by the assumption that “for women,” as 
Professor Douglas NeJaime has described it, “the social aspects 
of parenthood . . . flow inevitably from the biological.”205 
Yet it should be noted that one of the cases that Justice 
Gorsuch cited to support birth registration regimes “based on 
biology” did not privilege biological relationships.206  In Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., the Court upheld California’s conclusive marital
presumption as applied against a biological father attempting to
assert parentage over a child born from his extramarital affair
without the consent of the mother and her husband.207  Ironically,
when Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, declared that
“California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood,”208 he protected a purely social parenthood
sanctioned by marriage above a biological parenthood that
actually involved significantly greater social investment.209  In the
specific passage of Michael H. cited by Justice Gorsuch in
Pavan,210 Justice Scalia claimed that this presumption of
legitimacy for the husband over the natural father “was a
fundamental principle of the common law,” and that there was
nothing in such “older sources . . . addressing specifically the
power of the [unwed] natural father to assert parental rights”
superior to those of the husband.211  Michael H. therefore follows
203. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
204. Id. at 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
205. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L. J. 2260, 2280 (2017).
206. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
207. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-30 (1989) (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 118.
209. Id. at 113-15, 124.
210. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 124-25). 
211. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-25.
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from a history supporting a doctrine that discounts, rather than 
supports, biological connections.212 
2. The Anti-Stereotyping Principle
There were other cases in which the Court instead decided 
to reject stereotypes and assumptions about the capacities of men 
and women in all situations.  In Craig v. Boren, the intermediate-
scrutiny standard was forged to overturn Oklahoma’s sex-
differentiated drinking ages in part because “social stereotypes” 
were likely to “distort the accuracy” of the state’s purportedly 
empirical statistical methodologies.213  Cases prior to Craig had 
already invalidated various parental restrictions on fathers 
because of their motivation from similar stereotypes of the social 
roles of the sexes.214  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in which a 
husband and stay-at-home father dependent on his wife’s earnings 
fought for “mother’s benefits” after her death, was particularly 
remembered by his attorney, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as the “most 
critical” sex discrimination case decided in the 1970s.215 
Shortly after appointment to the Court, Justice Ginsburg 
would refine this anti-stereotyping doctrine with her majority 
opinion in United States v. Virginia, the case which opened the 
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to enrollment of women.216  
That opinion affirmed the “exceedingly persuasive justification,” 
a somewhat higher form of intermediate scrutiny for gender 
212. See id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that common law conclusive
marital presumption was formed in a time before blood tests could accurately prove 
paternity); see also id. at 161 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have now clearly recognized the 
use of blood tests as an authoritative means of evaluating allegations of paternity.”).  
213. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976).
214. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975) (invalidating
statute on due process grounds which provided social security benefits based on earnings of 
deceased spouse only to widows and children, excluding widowers); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 657-59 (1972) (concluding on both due process and equal protection grounds that 
unmarried fathers are entitled to the same proceedings on parental fitness as unwed mothers 
in dependency proceedings). 
215. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43 (1986); see also Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 NYU L. REV. 83, 132-42 (2010) (detailing
history of Wiesenfeld and other Burger Court cases establishing the anti-stereotyping
doctrine).
216. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
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classification which the Court first articulated in Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan.217  By rejecting the state of 
Virginia’s weak reasoning—that women could not generally cope 
with the “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress,” and other challenges of 
VMI’s “adversative method”218—Justice Ginsburg condemned 
and barred justifications relying on “overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females.”219 
In the case of VMI, because some women could bridge the 
physical gap and handle the social and psychological challenges 
of the adversative method, no proffered general difference 
between men and women could persuade the Court to allow 
exclusively male admission.220  As for whatever “inherent 
differences” between the sexes remain, they are “cause for 
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex 
or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”221  To 
the Court, one example of permitted gender classification would 
be operating a single-sex college designed “to dissipate, rather 
than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.”222  The Court 
thus applies the “exceedingly persuasive justification” review and 
anti-stereotyping doctrine to all gender classifications, including 
those implicating “real” differences, as both sword and shield 
against gender inequality.223  It would be a sword for plaintiffs to 
challenge governmental institutions relying on “overbroad 
generalizations” of gender, and it would be a shield for 
governments seeking to deconstruct gender roles through 
legitimate gender classifications.224 
217. Id. at 532-33 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982)). 
218. Id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 
1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)). 
219. Id. at 533, 550-51 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 550-51. 
221. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
222. Id. at 533 n.7 (quoting Brief of Twenty-six Private Women’s Colleges as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-
1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL 702837). 
223. Id. at 549, 556.
224. See id. at 533. 
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3. Nguyen v. INS
Yet Justice Kennedy would later turn Justice Ginsburg’s 
affirmation of the “[p]hysical differences between men and 
women” back onto her and the other dissenters in Nguyen v. 
INS.225  At issue was the constitutionality of an immigration 
statute which puts a greater burden on the citizenship claim for a 
nonmarital child when the child has a citizen father and a 
noncitizen mother.226  If the citizen parent is the mother, the child 
acquires the mother’s nationality status at birth.227  But for his 
child’s citizenship, the citizen father must not only prove a 
biological connection by clear and convincing evidence,228 but 
also provide additional evidence of his social bond, such as 
legitimation, a written acknowledgment of paternity, or 
adjudication of paternity.229 
The Court had previously considered this statute in Miller v. 
Albright and did not hold it unconstitutional, but the majority was 
split between three opinions of two justices each.230  Justice 
Stevens, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his opinion 
announcing the judgment, believed that the anti-stereotyping 
principle of Virginia was only “indirectly involved in this case” 
and that none of the premises of the statutory classification could 
be “fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional 
way of thinking about the members of either sex.”231 Justice 
Stevens concluded that “[t]he biological differences between 
single men and single women provide a relevant basis for 
differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on 
children born in foreign lands.”232 
In Nguyen, Justice Kennedy confirmed the applicability of 
that biological basis on behalf of a slim, 5-4 majority.233  There, 
225. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
226. Id. at 57-58. 
227. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1).
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4).
230. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1998) (Stevens, J.); id. at 445
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
231. Id. at 442, 444-45 (Stevens, J.).
232. Id. at 445.
233. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
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the Court purported to apply the standards of intermediate 
scrutiny, including the “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
standard of Hogan and Virginia.234 The Court then offered two 
important governmental interests for the statutory distinction 
between children of unwed citizen fathers and citizen mothers.235  
The first was “assuring that a biological parent-child relationship 
exists.”236  Justice Kennedy observed that this relation was 
“verifiable from the birth itself” in the mother’s case, but that the 
father “need not be present at birth” and cannot incontrovertibly 
verify paternity even with his presence.237  The Court rejected the 
challengers’ argument that it substitute gender-neutral DNA 
testing, as Congress was not constitutionally required to “elect 
one particular mechanism from among many possible methods of 
establishing paternity, even if that mechanism arguably might be 
the most scientifically advanced method.”238 
The second important interest was to ensure the 
“opportunity” for a parent-child relationship consisting of “real, 
everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen 
parent and, in turn, the United States.”239  For a citizen mother, 
such “opportunity” exists at the “initial point of contact” of 
birth.240  But that opportunity is not a “biological inevitability” 
for an unwed citizen father.241  The Court expressed a particular 
concern that a father might not know that he has a child and that 
a mother might not know the father’s identity.242 The Court then 
provided another reason to reject the exclusive use of DNA 
testing: that the proof of biological paternity “does nothing, by 
itself, to ensure contact between father and child during the 
child’s minority” and thereby satisfy the government interest in 
social opportunity.243 
234. Id. at 60-61, 70.
235. Id. at 62-68. 
236. Id. at 62-64. 
237. Id. at 62.
238. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
239. Id. at 64-65. 
240. Id. at 65.
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
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At the conclusion of his analysis of the interests, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the notion that the statute was based in gender 
stereotypes because it was not a conclusion of “irrational or 
uncritical analysis” to recognize that “the mother’s knowledge of 
the child and the fact of parenthood [are] established [at birth] in 
a way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.”244  To 
support the constitutional relevance of this observation, the Court 
cited Justice Ginsburg’s statement in Virginia that “[p]hysical 
differences between men and women . . . are enduring.”245 
In her vigorous dissent, Justice O’Connor criticized the 
Court on two fronts:  first, the Court failed to apply the proper 
standard of review; and second, the Court concealed and applied 
the kinds of stereotypes that heightened scrutiny is designed to 
eliminate.246  She emphasized that under intermediate scrutiny, 
unlike rational basis review, the government has the burden to 
prove an exceedingly persuasive justification, which means at 
least an important, actual government interest and a means of 
classification substantially related to that interest.247  Another 
difference between heightened scrutiny and rational basis review 
is the relevance of the availability of non-discriminatory 
alternatives.248  Neither interest asserted by the Court had a 
substantial fit,249 and one, the guarantee of “opportunity” for a 
social parental bond, was diluted in weight from the actual 
interest asserted by INS in formal proof of the bond in itself.250  
The requirement of proof for that opportunity also did not 
substantially further the opportunity.251  Sex-neutral alternatives, 
such as DNA tests or documentation of the father’s presence at 
birth, would be more effective in ensuring a biological record or 
the opportunity for a parental relationship.252 
But Justice O’Connor’s most damning argument was her 
demonstration that the government interest in the goal of a “real, 
244. Id. at 68.
245. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
246. Id. at 74, 83-91 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 74-75. 
248. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 82-83.
249. Id. at 80, 88.
250. Id. at 84-85. 
251. Id. at 85.
252. Id. at 80-81, 86.
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practical relationship” was only related to the statute by means of 
a stereotype.253  The Court’s appeals to “biological” reality cover 
for a generalization “that mothers are significantly more likely 
than fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their 
children.”254  This generalization, that the mother was the “natural 
guardian” of the nonmarital child, was Congress’s actual 
motivation, just as it had been the force behind centuries of 
common-law and statutory family regimes.255  The Court “relies 
on ‘the very stereotype the law condemns,’ ‘lends credibility’ to 
the generalization, and helps to convert that ‘assumption’ into a 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’”256  Even the Court’s definition of a 
stereotype to exclude only irrational “frame[s] of mind” was 
constitutionally misframed.257  Ever since Wiesenfeld, the Court 
had historically invalidated overbroad generalizations with 
empirical support “when more accurate and impartial functional 
lines [could] be drawn.”258 
4. Sessions v. Morales-Santana
In Morales-Santana, the Court appeared to vindicate Justice 
O’Connor’s view of the anti-stereotyping principle when it struck 
down a gender differential in immigration law related to the 
statute at issue in Nguyen.259  Under the applicable immigration 
rules, if a married couple of mixed citizenship had a child born 
abroad, the child would become a citizen if the citizen parent was 
physically present in the United States for five years before birth, 
two of which after age 14.260  This avenue was not open for unwed 
citizen fathers, but the presence requirement was lowered to one 
year before birth, with no age bracket, for unwed citizen 
253. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 88-89.
254. Id. at 89 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482-83 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
255. Id. at 91-92 (quoting To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United
States: Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 431 (1940)). 
256. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
257. Id. at 89-90. 
258. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 90 (quoting Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)). 
259. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
260. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012).
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mothers.261  In her majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg marked this 
disparity as “gender-based” and “gender-biased.”262  In doing so, 
she applied both the Virginia heightened scrutiny formulation of 
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” and an additional 
requirement that a classification “must substantially serve an 
important governmental interest today.”263  The latter derives 
from Justice Kennedy’s observation in Obergefell that in equal 
protection analysis, the Court has historically “recognized that 
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified 
inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”264 
The immigration statute’s differential treatment between 
both men and women and the married and unmarried was justified 
at its inception on the same “untenable” notion of the mother as 
“natural and sole guardian of a nonmarital child” that was 
condemned by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen.265  While 
the Court recognized this rationale as the kind of “overbroad 
generalizations” of gender “roles and abilities” that could not 
survive heightened scrutiny, it notably did not consider that the 
statute had any “biological” basis.266  The Court explicitly 
mentioned Nguyen to distinguish rather than overrule it, but only 
to point out that the parental-acknowledgment requirement was 
not contested and was also “minimal” in comparison to the 
physical-presence requirement.267 
III. ARGUMENT
A. THE ARKANSAS MAJORITY OPINION WAS
“CLEARLY IN ERROR” 
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never 
articulated any clear standard of review for summary reversals, 
Justice Gorsuch does not have an easy argument against the 
261. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
262. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 
84 (1979)). 
263. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
264. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603).
265. Id. at 1690-91. 
266. Id. at 1692. 
267. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.
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Court’s decision here even with the standard he suggests.  
Summary reversal, where the Court decides the merits of the case 
simultaneously with its grant of certiorari, has long been 
criticized,268 even if the practice is currently accepted.269  It is 
“well established” that the Court “has never been[] primarily 
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court 
decisions.”270  Because the Court primarily acts in a lawmaking 
capacity, it can also be problematic when a summary opinion 
makes law, as it is “poorly suited to the task,” having had no 
merits briefing and oral argument.271 
The opinion which Justice Gorsuch cites in Pavan,272 from 
Schweiker v. Hansen,273 was one of many dissents by Justice 
Marshall challenging the perceived abuse of summary disposition 
by the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts.274  In his most 
elaborate statement against the practice in Montana v. Hall, 
Justice Marshall suggested that because “per curiam” means 
“[b]y the court,” such opinions should be used only to “speak for 
the entire Court on a matter so clear that the Court can and should 
speak with one voice.”275  Otherwise, summary disposition 
“deprive[s] the litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard.”276  This 
is only one of a variety of arguments advanced by Justices across 
the ideological spectrum against summary reversals both in 
specific cases and in general.277 
Although it is now generally accepted that summary 
disposition is appropriate for correcting clearly erroneous lower 
268. Edward A. Hartnett, Summary Reversals in the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 591, 592-93 (2016) (summarizing history of summary reversal up to the Roberts 
Court). 
269. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 352 (10th ed. 2013).
270. Alex Hemmer, Student Essay, Courts as Managers: American Tradition
Partnership v. Bullock and Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 209, 212 (2013) (quoting Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 
Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949)). 
271. Id. at 212-13. 
272. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
273. 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
274. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 405 & n.1 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases). 
275. Id. at 409.
276. Id. at 405.
277. See Hemmer, supra note 270, at 219-23, 211 n.9 (collecting and analyzing
summary dispositions). 
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court decisions,278 recent scholarship has been critical of the 
Roberts Court’s relatively high ratio of summary reversal.279  One 
explanation is that the Court is acting in a “managerial capacity:” 
that summary disposition is “a tool to manage and oversee” an 
ever-larger docket of cert petitions.280  Though such caseload-
trimming has the procedural advantages of a more efficient rate 
of disposition, swift correction of egregious legal error, and 
conservation of the Court’s finite resources,281 it also sometimes 
results in arguably imprudent decisions on the facts or careless 
lawmaking.282  As Alex Hemmer argues, the Roberts Court’s 
disposition of “notably fact-bound” cases runs against a tradition 
of denying review to such cases,283 and lawmaking without 
adversarial presentation and plenary review runs the risk of 
“rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that may confuse 
the lower courts.”284  Hemmer argues that although “the benefits 
of a managerial approach are clear,” the Court should introduce 
restrictions on summary disposition to control the risk of error.285 
Yet Hemmer also notes the curious disposition of one such 
“managerial” case, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. 
Bullock,286 that was neither fact-bound nor legally contested, but 
rather simply partisan in posture.287  There, the Court, with five 
votes, summarily reversed the Supreme Court of Montana 
because the state court upheld an election statute which, with “no 
serious doubt,”288 was subject to and violated Citizens United v. 
278. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 269, at 234.
279. See Hartnett, supra note 268, at 593-94 (“[T]he odds of having a Supreme Court
merits decision handled summarily rather than with full briefing and argument are 
considerably greater than having a Supreme Court merits decision at all.”); Ira P. Robbins, 
Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 
TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (“In the first six years of Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, almost 
nine percent of the Court’s full opinions were per curiams.”). 
280. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 210.
281. Id. at 213.
282. See id. at 219-23. 
283. Id. at 219 (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 16 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)). 
284. Id. at 222 (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 349 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)). 
285. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 223-24. 
286. 567 U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam).
287. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 224.
288. Bullock, 567 U.S. at 516.
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FEC.289  The four-member dissent did not only refuse to accept 
Citizens United on its constitutional merit.290  It also saw that 
“Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere” 
with independent campaign expenditures by corporations, “casts 
grave doubt on the Court’s supposition” of the incorruptible 
nature of independent expenditures.291  Though the violation was 
indeed clear, and the majority clearly saw the law as “settled and 
stable,” the dissent “certainly saw the law as anything but settled 
and stable,” either because Citizen’s United was bad law at its 
inception or because the emerging facts of campaign financing 
discredited the decision’s value.292 
In Pavan, Justice Gorsuch does accuse the Court of 
answering an unsettled legal question with bad lawmaking.293  
While the Court’s lawmaking exercise appears to have broad 
strokes, Justice Gorsuch is effectively only disputing the language 
of settled law with bare assertions of interpretation.  His first 
dispute with the Court concerns the scope of Obergefell: Justice 
Gorsuch does not believe that Obergefell spoke “clearly,” or at 
all, to the validity of Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18-
401.294  By limiting Obergefell to its protection of marriage 
recognition, Justice Gorsuch echoes the concern of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court that the Circuit Court “conflated distinct 
categories” of marriage and other rights when the latter 
invalidated the statute.295 
Yet the Court’s decision is supported by more than a concern 
for the limitation of its own holdings.  Early cases recognizing the 
right to marry, from Maynard v. Hill to Loving, all linked the 
importance of marriage to the social necessity of procreation 
within marriage.296  As discussed previously, Zablocki went 
further and linked the right to marry with fundamental rights to 
289. Id. (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010)).
290. Id. at 517 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291. Id. 
292. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 224.
293. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
294. Id.
295. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 16-17, 505 S.W.3d 169, 180.
296. See cases cited supra notes 150-153.
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procreation and to other incidents of the family.297  States 
administer birth certificates partly to record procreation or 
adoption and ensure that the state gives parents all available 
public benefits of having children within marriage.298  Because 
birth certificates are thus historically attendant on rights to the 
incidents of the family,299 it does not make constitutional sense to 
deny a birth certificate which fully recognizes a marriage where 
the spouses mutually consent to the biological parenthood of one 
and the functional parenthood of both.  Such a position becomes 
even less constitutionally tenable once one takes Turner into 
account.  In Turner, Justice O’Connor lists the “legitimation of 
children born out of wedlock” as one of the legal incidents of the 
protected marriage relationship.300  As birth certificates are the 
primary record of such legitimacy,301 the legitimizing purpose of 
marriage is certainly thwarted if both spouses cannot list their 
names on a birth certificate for a child they conceived within the 
marriage. 
Obergefell itself cites all of these cases and yet does even 
more to ensure an equality of benefits between same-sex 
couples.302  In the same sentence in Obergefell where the Court 
unambiguously makes a binding holding by overruling Baker v. 
Nelson, it fashions a remedy: “[T]he State laws challenged by 
Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they 
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms 
297. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1978) (citing Carey v. Population
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)). 
298.  See Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 396-98 (2014)
(“The birth certificate assigns, memorializes, and codifies the parent-child relationship as the 
law constructs it.  This creates a range of protections, freedoms, benefits, and obligations for 
the parents and the child.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her 
Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 213 (2009) (“[O]ur laws facilitate the formation of legal parental 
relationships within the context of adult relationships recognized by law.  This method of 
assigning legal parentage is grounded in the expectation that the two members of the legally 
cognizable adult relationship will raise the child.”). 
299. Appell, supra note 298, at 396-97.
300. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
301. See Appell, supra note 298, at 393 (“The birth certificate literally signifies
legitimacy (or a lack thereof). . . . [T]he birth certificate continues to track the legal 
relationship status of a child’s parents—a status that can affect the rights (and disabilities) a 
child will have.”). 
302. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2601 (2015).
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and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”303  In the previous two 
sentences, the Court made its basic holding that the liberty of 
marriage could no longer be denied to same-sex couples.304 
Justice Gorsuch would have this be the only holding of 
Obergefell and have that last sentence remain as dicta.305  But the 
prescribed remedy is also a holding because it is the only remedy 
the Court lays down.306  Its unambiguous plain language extends 
beyond marriage recognition alone to the entire contract between 
the married family and society.307  With the support of the full 
factual and procedural context of Obergefell, the Court in Pavan 
concluded that this holding was correct.308  Precedent dating back 
to Turner (and Zablocki, if only for benefits attending 
procreation) further supports the Court’s holding.309  Justice 
Gorsuch, on the other hand, offers no support for his implied 
303. Id. at 2604-05 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 2604.
305. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
306. One of the narrowest definitions of “holding” as opposed to “dicta” is the
“necessity” definition:  those parts of the opinion that are “necessary” to the result.  See 
Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
219, 223 & nn.24-26 (2010).  If we define the Court’s “same terms and conditions” remedy 
in Obergefell as the remedy, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605, then under a broad definition of 
“necessary to the result,” that remedy is the holding because it is the result.  See Stinson, 
supra, at 223 (internal quotations omitted).  But as scholars have noted, taking the necessity 
approach to its logical conclusion would “not allow a case to have precedential weight as 
applied to any other case.”  Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. 
L. REV. 661, 676 (2018).  For that reason, modern scholars reject both the “necessity”
approach and the “pure” limitation of a case to its facts and outcome.  Id. at 674-75, 704. 
Yet under the more manageably narrow “material” facts-and-outcome approach suggested
by Arthur Goodhart—which finds the “principle of the case” in the facts treated as material
and the decision based on them—the Obergefell remedy is still a holding.  Arthur Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 181-83 (1930).  Goodhart’s
most relevant principle of “materiality” here is that “[i]f the opinion does not distinguish
between material and immaterial facts,” then all facts in an opinion are material.  Id. at 182. 
Because Obergefell neither explicitly delineates material facts nor “impliedly treats”
particular facts as immaterial, see id., one may conclude that the plaintiffs’ desire for marital
benefits and the “aspects of marital status” listed by the Court were both “material” facts.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594-95, 2601 (emphasis added).  Because the invalidation of
statutes limiting the right to marry “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples” impliedly follows from these facts, that remedy is a holding.  Id. at 2605; But see
generally Michaels, supra (critiquing various holding/dicta models, including Goodhart’s,
and offering his own).
307. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
308. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2076, 2078-79. 
309. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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contention that this guarantee of a social contract between two 
spouses and a state is only the dicta of Obergefell.310 
Justice Gorsuch follows his misguided analysis of 
Obergefell’s scope with a few other unsupported assertions.  He 
does not argue that any court beyond this case has held that 
reasons for biology-based birth registration regimes exist which 
“in no way offend Obergefell.”311  Justice Gorsuch instead recites 
the State’s arguments and approves of “biological” birth 
registration regimes with citation to two cases predating 
Obergefell and addressing distinct questions of law.312  And 
without fully addressing the Court’s guarantee of a social contract 
between the marriage and the state, Justice Gorsuch simply 
asserts that Arkansas law creates a biology-based birth 
registration regime and that Obergefell does not address purely 
biology-based birth registration regimes.313 
As the Court and Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Danielson 
both adequately explain, Arkansas’s birth certificate statutes tie 
birth certificates to marriage, and not only to biology.314  While 
the Court points to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-
201(a), the statute imputing paternity to the husband with 
conception by anonymous sperm donation,315 Justice Danielson 
cuts even deeper to the statute actually at issue, section 20-18-
401(f).316  The statute establishes the kind of presumption of 
paternity in marriage that the Court upheld in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D.,317 in which the husband was presumed the father until 
a court or the mother rebuts that presumption.318 
310. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
311. Id. 
312. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 124-125 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
313. Id. 
314. See id. at 2078-79 (majority opinion); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 35-36,
505 S.W.3d 169, 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
315. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79. 
316. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 35-36, 505 S.W.3d at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
317. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117-18, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed 1994)). 
318. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2014) (presumption rebuttable
with paternity adjudication or affidavits executed by mother, husband, and putative father), 
with CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (presumption rebuttable with blood test performed pursuant to 
motion by husband or mother within two years of birth).   
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The Court may have decided to recognize broader relevant 
boundaries to the Arkansas birth registration regime than Justice 
Danielson did in order to avoid unnecessarily applying Michael 
H. to the case or reviving its constitutional questions.
Nonetheless, the primary utility of the parental presumption as a
protector of social institutions, marriage and family, is
unassailable.319  That policy, which Justice Danielson called
“obvious,” renders the parental presumption an incident of
marriage even if birth certificates were designed to also
accurately record biological descent.320  Because the Arkansas
Supreme Court instead read a pure biological basis into the birth
certificate regime,321 it was in clear legal error with respect to its
method of statutory interpretation.
Justice Gorsuch neither cites any authority which directly 
contradicts the Court on its broader interpretation of Obergefell 
nor otherwise provides a convincing rebuttal to the substantive 
holding of Pavan.  He has thus presented a case against summary 
reversal even weaker than the American Tradition Partnership 
dissent, characterized by shaky statutory interpretation rather than 
adequate support for legal dispute or bold broadsides against the 
underlying doctrine behind same-sex marriage.  If Justice 
Gorsuch only took the route of American Tradition Partnership 
and simply rejected Obergefell, he would have had plenty of 
rhetorical ammunition, courtesy of Obergefell’s dissenting 
opinions.322  But even if Justice Gorsuch did that, the Court and 
the facts nonetheless show the clear error in the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
319. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 35, 505 S.W.3d at 190. 
322. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2626-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640-43 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
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B. HOW PAVAN AND MORALES-SANTANA LIMIT
NGUYEN 
Scholars have largely backed Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Nguyen ever since the decision was handed down.323  While 
sharing the concerns she expressed, some also attributed 
concealed rationales to the majority, including the unsympathetic 
character of the petitioner and a deference towards Congress’s 
plenary power over immigration.324  And since even before 
Morales-Santana was decided, scholars have anticipated that it or 
a similar decision would limit the application of Nguyen in both 
immigration law and the more general family law context.325  As 
323. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1187, 1192-93, 1219-21 (2016) (citing Nguyen as an example of the “inferior” legal status 
of unwed fathers derived from equal protection doctrine focused on integration of the family 
and the market, rather than individual liberty); Buchanan, supra note 199, at 1182-85 
(arguing the Court applied a “sex discount” in Nguyen to purported heightened scrutiny to 
accommodate cultural assumptions that men have a “biologically-programmed” indifference 
to their children and that this apathy is “cured” by marriage); David B. Cruz, Disestablishing 
Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1085 (2002) (arguing that feminist analyses against 
“sex/gender ideologies” would help the Court avoid “mistakes” such as Nguyen); Russell K. 
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 208-10 (2016) (agreeing with Justice 
O’Connor’s criticisms, noting that Justice Kennedy “transgressed doctrinal boundaries” of 
heightened scrutiny and that the stereotype he advanced was a “paternalistic conception of 
mothers”); Jung Kim, Comment, Nguyen v. INS: The Weakening of Equal Protection in the 
Face of Plenary Power, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 43, 54 (2002) (“[T]he Court glaringly 
reveals its own limitations and prejudices regarding its archaic notions of women and men, 
mothers and fathers.”). 
324. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 215, at 148 n.352 (pointing to the Court’s
reiteration without judgment of Justice Stevens’s suggestion in Miller that a more deferential 
standard of review was appropriate for an exercise of Congress’s immigration and 
naturalization power); Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A 
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 836 (2002) (suggesting that if the 
Court did not implicitly account for the immigration context, the Court would not likely have 
sustained an overt sex-based classification as “overbroad and ill matched to its objective” as 
the distinction drawn by the statute); Kim, supra note 323, at 58-59, 62-63 (surmising that 
the Court was holding Nguyen accountable for his child sexual assault convictions and 
noting signs of the Court’s “discomfort” with challenging congressional plenary power). 
325. The residency requirements at issue in Morales-Santana were previously
reckoned with by the Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, but that decision only affirmed 
the Ninth Circuit by an equally divided Court thanks to Justice Kagan’s recusal.  Flores-
Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam) aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
One commentator speculated that if a challenge to the statute again arrived, the Court would 
overrule Nguyen or at least resolve its tension with Virginia in the latter’s favor.  Stephen 
Kanter, Essay, Brevity is the Soul of Wit: Nguyen is Dead, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1305, 
1314-15 (2012).  After the Court granted certiorari in Morales-Santana, Professor Douglas 
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Professor Kristin Collins argues in her commentary on Morales-
Santana, for which she co-wrote an amicus brief,326 Justice 
Kennedy’s choice of employing a “watered-down” equal 
protection analysis as if it were any other nonimmigration statute 
(i.e., without invocation of the plenary power doctrine) led to it 
becoming “easily enlisted as a precedent in domestic family law 
cases” involving the gender-based regulation of parentage and the 
family in general.327 
Absent the intervention of the Court, the state court decision 
in Pavan would have joined this cohort of successful application 
of the pseudo-biological reasoning of Nguyen to state family law.  
Given that Justice Gorsuch approved of Nguyen’s analysis, and 
given that Morales-Santana did not overrule or explicitly limit its 
logic, Nguyen still presents a palpable threat to the equal status of 
same-sex couples in parenthood.  Both scholars and some lower 
courts have attacked the philosophical premise of Nguyen and 
similar cases rendering legal significance to “real” gender 
differences.328  Any further philosophical or pre-Nguyen 
constitutional attack by this author on Nguyen would be 
redundant and unoriginal.  It would also not be as powerful as an 
application of subsequent Supreme Court decisions.  Advocates 
for recognition of functional same-sex parenthood outside of 
biological motherhood must find some post-Nguyen answer by 
the Court to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.  This need is demonstrated 
NeJaime predicted that if the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision, it would possibly 
“begin to question the wisdom of relying on biological justifications to distinguish between 
motherhood and fatherhood for purposes of family law.”  NeJaime, supra note 205, at 2354.  
And once the decision came, Professor Kristin Collins argued that Morales-Santana does 
limit Nguyen’s application.  Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in 
Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 199-200 (2017).  One should be careful to temper 
speculation about the Court’s future direction on this issue however, given that Justice 
Gorsuch did not participate in Morales-Santana and given the likelihood of a future Supreme 
Court appointment during the presidency of Donald Trump.  Id. at 201 n.185. 
326. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law in 
Support of Respondent, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (No. 15-1191), 
2016 WL 5800340. 
327. Collins, supra note 325, at 195; see, e.g., Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 
125 P.3d 461, 470 (Haw. 2005); Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245-46 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013); Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 308 (Ct. App. 2006). 
328. See, e.g., Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1265-66
(D. Colo. 2016) (endorsing the empowering treatment of “real” gender differences in 
Virginia and ignoring Nguyen to invalidate an ordinance prohibiting public female breast 
exposure). 
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by the fact that other lawyers continue to use Nguyen to privilege 
biological over nonbiological parents, even after Morales-
Santana and Pavan.329 
Kristin Collins convincingly argues that Morales-Santana 
helps these advocates advance part of the way towards an 
answer.330  The majority opinion offered a “clear account of the 
gender-based stereotypes concerning parental roles that have 
shaped the derivative citizenship statute in its every detail.”331  
“[W]ithout so much as blinking,” Collins notes, “the Court held 
that it would approach ‘all gender-based classifications’ with the 
same judicial skepticism.”332  From this posture, she posits a 
“significant tension” between laws privileging the biological 
mother’s position as “natural guardian” above the rights and 
responsibilities of nonbiological parents, on the one hand, and 
“Morales-Santana’s deep skepticism of gender-based allocations 
of parental rights and status,” on the other.333  She also points to 
the Court’s “modernizing message” that gender-based 
distinctions must “serve an important governmental interest 
today,” noting that this “forward-looking understanding of 
equality” was lifted from Obergefell.334  Collins predicts that 
advocates for recognition of “the various functional parenting 
relationships that exist outside of . . . biological motherhood”—
including those of same-sex couples and their children—will use 
Morales-Santana to compel judges and legislators to attend to 
“unjustified” forms of inequality which have previously “passed 
unnoticed and unchallenged.”335 
Indeed, the patently heteronormative logic of Nguyen’s 
“natural guardian” narrative is laughably anachronistic in the face 
of two-mother parenthood, where the non-biological mother’s 
329. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Movants-Intervenors-Appellants at 18, Witt v. Witt, No.
E2017-00884-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1505485 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018), 2017 WL 
6888042; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-13, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct. 
1165 (2018) (No. 17-878), 2017 WL 6508408. 
330. Collins, supra note 325, at 202-03. 
331. Id. at 173.
332. Id. at 174 (quoting Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017)).
333. Id. at 203.
334. Id. at 200 (quoting Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (citing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015))). 
335. Collins, supra note 325, at 203 (quoting Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1684
(quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603)). 
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parental involvement is usually assured by the fact that 
conception involves many more practical and legal steps than one 
single session of unprotected sex.336  But in Pavan, the State of 
Arkansas did not offer the possibility of the nonbiological 
mother’s lack of presence at birth as its biological rationale.  
Rather, the State attempted to explain that the birth certificate 
regime was only a genetic record made to advance the child’s 
health and potential legal rights.337  Such an exclusionary 
contention—that the scheme could only be a genetic record—was 
easily dispelled by the Court when it pointed to the exceptions 
with a marriage- or adoption-protecting operation.338  Nguyen 
relied on precedent that also posited purportedly “biological“ 
motivations to statutes which, like those involved in Nguyen, 
were stirred by and protected gender roles in parenting.339 
The application by Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito of 
Nguyen to “biology based” policies with a narrower and more 
“purely” biological rationale, protecting health through genetic 
records,340 seems at first glance an acceptably restrained use of 
Nguyen, as there is no stereotype involved in the basic facts of 
genetics.  Though it is arguably an overbroad generalization to 
presume that fathers will not be present at birth, it is only fact that 
the parent contributing sperm in conception may pass unhealthy 
genes to the child.341  The problem with assuming Justice 
336. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 494-95 (Ariz.
2017) (presenting facts where both partners attempt to conceive using anonymous sperm 
donors, parents enter into “joint parenting agreement” to ensure rights pre-Obergefell, 
nonbiological mother stays home to raise the child for first two years, and the same mother 
sues to enforce the parenting agreement). 
337. See Defendant’s Reply, supra note 49, at 8-9.
338. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (per curiam).
339. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 260 n.16 (1983)); see also Ben-Asher, supra note 323, at 1231-32 (noting that equal 
protection claims in cases like Lehr “often fail” because of perceptions of biological 
differences). 
340. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
341. Through “multifactorial” inheritance, a combination of multiple genes and
environmental factors may lead to common disorders like heart disease, high blood pressure, 
Alzheimer’s disease, arthritis, diabetes, cancer, and obesity.  See Melissa Conrad Stöppler, 
Genetic Diseases (Inherited) Symptoms, Causes, Treatments, and Prognosis, 
MEDICINENET.COM, https://www.medicinenet.com/genetic_disease/article.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YRN6-Z9WQ] (last visited May 17, 2018).  The effects of “epigenetic 
inheritance patterns,” changes made to gene expression by experiences and habits, are 
increasingly under close study.  See J.R. Thorpe, How a Man’s Health Affects the Genetics 
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Gorsuch’s restraint of Nguyen is that he was wrong to argue a 
purely biological logic behind the State’s motivation, since the 
statutory scheme was not purely a genetic record on several 
fronts.342  Justice Gorsuch is actually expanding the application 
of Nguyen to whatever laws he sees fit, even if the facts do not 
support his analysis.  The analytical posture of the three 
dissenting votes thus presents itself as substantial competition to 
Morales-Santana, which limits Nguyen to its facts by affirming 
Virginia’s application to all gender-based classifications.343  
Further change in the ideological composition of the Court could 
thus easily result in the expansion of Nguyen at the expense of 
Morales-Santana and Virginia. 
Because “Morales-Santana certainly will not do all the 
work” in challenging the gendered pseudo-biological logic of 
Nguyen, we must propose additional tools for the task.344  And for 
married individuals seeking to claim status as parents of the 
biological children of their same-sex spouses, the Pavan majority 
offers that tool, especially when used in conjunction with 
Morales-Santana.345  Before Obergefell, states’ defense counsel 
sometimes used Nguyen to respond to arguments that the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage or limitations on the rights of 
lawful same-sex spouses constituted sex discrimination.346  With 
Pavan, there is no more room for states to prevent same-sex 
spouses from embracing the rights that opposite-sex spouses 
enjoy.347 
The Pavan majority emphasized Obergefell’s protection of 
“civil marriage ‘on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex 
couples’” with no qualifiers.348  The list of “terms and conditions” 
was not simply made to support Obergefell’s application of the 
fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples, as the Arkansas 
of His Offspring, BUSTLE (May 16, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/160983-how-a-
mans-health-affects-the-genetics-of-his-offspring [https://perma.cc/LL9N-476L] (collecting 
studies). 
342. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (section 9-10-201); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark.
437, at 35-36, 505 S.W.3d 169, 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (section 20-18-401(f)(1)). 
343. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017). 
344. Collins, supra note 325, at 203.
345. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79; Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689.
346. See Collins, supra note 325, at 195 n.152 (collecting briefs).
347. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
348. Id. at 2076 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)).
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majority supposed.349  Rather, Obergefell entitles same-sex 
couples to all “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” of marriage 
that are established for opposite-sex couples, not simply marriage 
recognition.350  Used on its own, this absolute command to award 
a right to same-sex couples where the right attends opposite-sex 
marriage should call courts to deeply scrutinize claims of a law’s 
“biological” motivation.  The Pavan majority itself went to great 
lengths to dispel the State’s conception of its birth certificate 
regime as a purely genetic registry; it traversed traditional 
boundaries of statutory review by invoking statutes that were not 
at issue in the case but were nonetheless components of a larger 
birth certificate system.351 
One of the few lower court decisions that has so far relied on 
Pavan did so, like the Pavan majority, by sidestepping a 
philosophical confrontation with Nguyen’s premises in favor of 
direct application of Pavan’s absolute expansion of Obergefell.352  
In McLaughlin v. Jones in and for County of Pima, the Arizona 
Supreme Court expanded the statutory presumption of paternity 
to any woman whose wife gives birth to a child during the 
marriage.353  In that case, a non-biological mother, Suzan 
McLaughlin, filed for dissolution of her marriage to birth mother 
Kimberly McLaughlin, legal decision-making in loco parentis, 
and “parenting time.”354  The trial court relied on Obergefell to 
apply to Suzan the same presumption of paternity “that applies to 
a similarly situated man in an opposite-sex marriage.”355 
Although the intermediate appellate court affirmed,356 
another division of that court reached a contrary result in Turner 
v. Steiner.357  That court concluded that a female same-sex spouse
349. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 10, 505 S.W.3d 169, 176-77.
350. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
351. Id. at 2077-79 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015)).
352. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017).
353. Id. at 498.
354. Id. at 494-95.  In Arizona, “parenting time” is a statutory term for what is
traditionally known as parental visitation.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(5) (2019); Owen 
v. Blackhawk, 79 P.3d 667, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  “Visitation” is defined separately as
a third-party child access schedule.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(7).
355. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 495.
356. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 382 P.3d 118, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2016). 
357. Turner v. Steiner, 398 P.3d 110, 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
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could not benefit from the presumption of paternity, due to its 
basis in the biological differences between men and women, and 
that Obergefell imposed no contrary requirement.358  There, the 
majority not only relied on Nguyen,359 but also borrowed from the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Pavan by imposing the latter’s 
constricted limitation of Obergefell to marriage recognition.360  
The dissenting judge believed that a gender-neutral interpretation 
was consistent with Obergefell’s recognition that the right to 
marry provides “profound benefits” to children raised by same-
sex couples.361 
In light of Pavan and its own interpretation of Obergefell, 
the Arizona Supreme Court abrogated Turner and held the 
paternity presumption’s gender-specific application 
unconstitutional.362  The legal parent status conferred by the 
paternity presumption was “undoubtedly[] a benefit of marriage,” 
and the gender-specific language of the statute authorized 
“differential treatment of similarly situated same-sex couples.”363  
Although the court assumed the constitutional validity of 
Nguyen’s argument that “fathers and mothers are not similarly 
situated with regard to proof of biological parenthood,” it 
disclaimed any relevance of biological parentage to the facts.364  
For the court, Nguyen did not apply to facts where “males and 
females are similarly situated but treated differently.”365  Justice 
Bolick, partially concurring, recognized that equitable 
considerations may favor Suzan’s parenting rights, but he 
nonetheless dissented from the court’s “rewrit[ing]” of the 
paternity statute.366  He would have affirmed the constitutionality 
of its existing form, citing Nguyen.367  Justice Bolick also implied 
that Pavan only condemns “the absence of a mechanism to 
358. Id. at 113-16. 
359. Id. at 115 (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001)).
360. Id. at 114 (citing Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 9-10, 505 S.W.3d 169, 176-
77). 
361. Id. at 117 (Winthrop, J., dissenting) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2600 (2015)). 
362. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017).
363. Id. at 497.
364. Id. at 498 (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54).
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 503 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
367. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 503 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63).
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provide parenthood opportunities to single-sex couples on equal 
terms.”368 
Likely for the sake of judicial economy, the McLaughlin 
majority missed an opportunity to challenge the pseudo-
biological premise of Nguyen in light of the stricter equal 
protection analysis affirmed in Morales-Santana.  As a result, the 
defendant birth mother, Kimberly, was left free to use both 
Nguyen and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Pavan to support the 
central argument of her petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.369  There, she interpreted the paternity statute as having an 
exclusively biological basis and accepted Justice Gorsuch’s 
Nguyen-inflected contention that “nothing in Obergefell indicates 
that a birth registration regime based on biology . . . offends the 
Constitution.”370  But not only did Kimberly gloss over the social 
functions of the paternity presumption, such as the protection of 
marriage and the parental rights of the spouse married to the birth 
mother;371 she also failed to reckon with Morales-Santana and its 
broad application to all gender-based classifications.372  It would 
have been interesting to see whether the Court would have closely 
considered Kimberly’s arguments, but the Court instead denied 
her petition, leaving the constitutional merit of Nguyen and 
Justice Gorsuch’s Pavan dissent in ongoing contention.373 
Some of the other briefs and motions discussing either 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent or some other conjunction between 
Nguyen and Pavan have also bypassed the Morales-Santana test 
and accepted Justice Gorsuch’s assumption of the importance of 
a biological basis to a birth registration regime in constitutional 
review of those statutes.374  On the other hand, there is one federal 
368. Id. 
369. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, 7, 11-13, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.
Ct. 1165 (2017) (No. 17-878), 2017 WL 6508408. 
370. Id. at 7 (quoting Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting)). 
371.  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-27, 130 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“Here, to provide protection to an adulterous father is to deny protection to a marital 
father.”). 
372. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017).
373. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct. 1165, denying cert. sub nom. to 
McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017). 
374. See Reply Brief of Movants-Intervenors-Appellants, at 18, Witt v. Witt, No. 
E2017-00884-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1505485 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018), 2017 WL 
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district court brief that this author has found which does integrate 
Morales-Santana and Pavan into the same constitutional 
analysis.375  That brief was written for Arroyo Gonzalez v. 
Rossello Nevares, a case that does not involve same-sex marriage, 
but does implicate both birth certificates and another issue of 
LGBT rights.376 
Before the district court’s ruling in April 2018, Puerto Rico 
denied birth certificate amendments to transgender persons that 
accurately reflect their gender identities without revealing their 
transgender status.377  In support of their motion for summary 
judgment, the Arroyo Gonzalez plaintiffs cited Virginia and 
Morales-Santana for their challenge to Puerto Rico’s Birth 
Certificate Policy as sex discrimination in violation of equal 
protection.378  In their criticism of the Commonwealth’s 
purported government interest in providing a “historical X-ray 
document of the person at birth,”379 the plaintiffs pointed to the 
statutory substitution, upon adoption, of a certificate including 
only adoptive parents’ names for the original birth certificate.380  
Puerto Rico had, like Arkansas in Pavan, chosen to give a 
significance to birth certificates beyond biology.381  Although 
these plaintiffs, like other litigants, have chosen not to directly 
challenge the flawed premises of Nguyen or Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent, they have nonetheless utilized Pavan to rebut arguments 
for the existence of a purely biology-based birth records 
regime.382  The district court ultimately ruled in the plaintiffs’ 
favor on separate constitutional grounds, but the Commonwealth 
6888042; but see also Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at 37-38, Ermold v. Davis, Nos. 
17-6119, 17-6233 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2018), 2018 WL 572796 (conceding that Obergefell was 
“unclear” as to rights other than marriage itself, but also emphasizing that the latter right was 
“clearly established” in Obergefell). 
375. Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2-6, Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 
(D.P.R. 2018) (No. 3:17-CV-01457) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum], 2017 WL 
6398353. 
376. Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 328 (D.P.R. 2018).
377. Id. 
378. Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum, supra note 375, at 3-4.
379. Id. at 5.
380. Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 1136 (2017)).
381. Id. (citing Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (per curiam)).
382. Id. (citing Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79). 
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might appeal to the First Circuit.383  It will be interesting to see 
how far the Arroyo Gonzalez plaintiffs, along with other 
transgender plaintiffs seeking birth certificate changes, take their 
analyses of Morales-Santana and Pavan in the future. 
Understandably, litigants on behalf of spouses in same-sex 
marriages and their children may not have the resources to revive 
a challenge to Nguyen after Morales-Santana in any context other 
than deportation proceedings involving the parental 
acknowledgment requirements.  They may also believe that the 
Court in Morales-Santana did not do enough to limit Nguyen’s 
application to “biology-based family law even if it rejected the 
myth of birth mother as “natural guardian,” one of Nguyen’s 
pseudo-biological premises.384  But as Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, 
and Alito push to find purportedly “biological“ government 
interests using even weaker arguments than that of Nguyen,385 
these litigants should find any way possible to limit them in order 
to succeed.  Nguyen and its precedents upheld sexist, 
heteronormative stereotypes cloaked as purportedly “biological“ 
truisms.386  Both the broad anti-stereotyping principle of Morales-
Santana and the wide-ranging and absolute Obergefell 
interpretation held by the Pavan majority provide tools to protect 
the rights of married same-sex parents from the dangers of 
broadly applying these cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Pavan v. Smith is a rare kind of summary reversal for the 
Supreme Court for three reasons.  First, it engages in what first 
appears to be unusually broad lawmaking for a summary 
reversal.387  Second, it renders this broad expansion of Obergefell 
with a compelling, yet simple argument—that the broad scope of 
the right to marry was already made plain in Obergefell.388  But 
finally, and most importantly, its dissent demonstrates the broader 
383. Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 327, 333-34 (D.P.R. 2018).
384. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1691 (2017) (citing Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 91-92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
385. See discussion supra Section III.A.
386. See discussion supra Section III.B.
387. See Hemmer, supra note 270, at 221-23. 
388. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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doctrinal character of a new justice and foreshadows the way the 
Court could potentially treat Obergefell and its broader 
constitutional sphere.389  The Court in Pavan confirms that same-
sex couples can now light on every star in a “constellation of 
benefits” of marriage.390  Meanwhile, Justice Gorsuch confirms 
his denial of any right to these material benefits while offering no 
alternative.391  The Court in Morales-Santana repudiates all 
stereotypes and “overbroad generalizations” used to justify 
gender discrimination.392  Yet Justice Gorsuch in Pavan shows he 
is willing to apply Nguyen to disregard statutory text and possibly 
defend stereotypes, all to help justify a state’s proffered 
“biological“ distinctions.393 
Advocates should be optimistic for the power of Pavan to 
defend married same-sex couples and similar parties from the 
discriminatory encroachment of governments on their birth 
certificates and other rights attending marriage.394  But because 
the Court may ideologically shift in the future of the Trump 
Administration, advocates should also attempt to limit the force 
of Justice Gorsuch’s future use of Nguyen by meeting him with 
Morales-Santana and, where applicable, Pavan.  Both a 
constellation of benefits and a universe of equal protection may 
depend on whether the legal community will treat Pavan’s 
diminutive opinion and dissent with the seriousness they deserve. 
BRAD ALDRIDGE 
389. See Collins, supra note 325, at 201 n.185.
390. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per curiam).
391. Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
392. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
393. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
394. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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APPENDIX 
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-401(e), (f) (2014) 
(e) For the purposes of birth registration, the mother is
deemed to be the woman who gives birth to the child, unless 
otherwise provided by state law or determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the birth certificate. 
The information about the father shall be entered as provided in 
subsection (f) of this section. 
(f) (1) If the mother was married at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth the name of 
the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the 
child, unless: 
(A) Paternity has been determined otherwise by a
court of competent jurisdiction; or 
(B) The mother executes an affidavit attesting that
the husband is not the father and that the putative father 
is the father, and the putative father executes an 
affidavit attesting that he is the father and the husband 
executes an affidavit attesting that he is not the father. 
Affidavits may be joint or individual or a combination 
thereof, and each signature shall be individually 
notarized. In such event, the putative father shall be 
shown as the father on the certificate and the parents 
may give the child any surname they choose. 
(2) If the mother was not married at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth, the name of 
the father shall not be entered on the certificate of birth without 
an affidavit of paternity signed by the mother and the person to 
be named as the father. The parents may give the child any 
surname they choose. 
(3) In any case in which paternity of a child is determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name of the father and 
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surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate of birth in 
accordance with the finding and order of the court. 
(4) If the father is not named on the certificate of birth, no
other information about the father shall be entered on the 
certificate. 
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-406(a)(2) (2014) 
(a) The State Registrar of Vital Records shall establish a
new certificate of birth for a person born in this state when he or 
she receives the following: 
. . . 
(2) A request that a new certificate be established
and any evidence, as required by regulation, proving 
that the person has been legitimated, or that a court of 
competent jurisdiction has determined the paternity of 
the person or that both parents have acknowledged the 
paternity of the person and request that the surname be 
changed from that shown on the original certificate. 
Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-201 (2015) 
(a) Any child born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child 
of the woman and the woman’s husband if the husband consents 
in writing to the artificial insemination. 
(b) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a
woman who is married at the time of the birth of the child shall 
be presumed to be the child of the woman giving birth and the 
woman’s husband except in the case of a surrogate mother, in 
which event the child shall be that of: 
(1) The biological father and the woman intended
to be the mother if the biological father is married; 
(2) The biological father only if unmarried; or
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(3) The woman intended to be the mother in cases
of a surrogate mother when an anonymous 
donor’s sperm was utilized for artificial insemination. 
(c) (1) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a
woman who is unmarried at the time of the birth of the child shall 
be, for all legal purposes, the child of the woman giving birth, 
except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which event the child 
shall be that of: 
(A) The biological father and the woman intended
to be the mother if the biological father is married; 
(B) The biological father only if unmarried; or
(C) The woman intended to be the mother in cases
of a surrogate mother when an anonymous 
donor’s sperm was utilized for artificial insemination. 
(2) For birth registration purposes, in cases of surrogate
mothers the woman giving birth shall be presumed to be the 
natural mother and shall be listed as such on the certificate of 
birth, but a substituted certificate of birth may be issued upon 
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
